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Juvenile Computer Crime-Hacking:
Criminal and Civil Liability
by HELEN W. YEE*
I
Introduction
Computer systems represented an intellectual challenge to
seven Milwaukee teenage boys. Armed with home computers,
modems, and limited computer programming knowledge, they in-
vaded the electronic data processing systems of over sixty com-
mercial and governmental institutions during a six to eight month
period. Among the systems they penetrated were the computers
at a cement company in Canada, a consulting firm in Dallas, Se-
curity Pacific Bank in Los Angeles, Memorial Sloan-Kettering
Cancer Center in New York, and Los Alamos National Labora-
tory.' Their incursions ended only when the Federal Bureau of
Investigation discovered their activity and confiscated their
equipment.2
What these teenagers did was not an isolated incident.3 As com-
* Member, Third Year Class; A.B., University of California at Berkley, 1976; M.L.S.,
University of California at Berkeley, 1978. This note is dedicated to the memory of my
father, a Chinese immigrant who placed his dreams in the United States public education
system.
1. Marbach, Beware: Hackers at Play, NEWswEEK, Sept. 5,1983, at 42-43; New Wave
Computer Crime, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 29, 1983, at 45; see generally Testimony of Neal Patrick
in Computer and Communications Security and Privacy: Hearings Before the Subcommit.
tee on Transportation, Aviation and Materials of the House Committee on Science and
Technology, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-24 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Computer
and Communications Security and Privacy].
2. See supra note 1.
3. For other instances of juvenile computer crime, see Gibbs, Hacker Was 2 Numbers
Awayfrom Fantasy: Access to Grades, San Francisco Examiner, Feb. 12,1985, at Al, col. 2
(teenager's attempt to access Stanford's IBM 3084, in order to set up a grade-changing ser.
vice, is foiled); Goode, 'Homework'for Teen Hackers, San Francisco Chron., Dec. 12, 1984, at
2, col. 1 (three teenage boys allegedly decoded GTE Sprint customer authorization codes
and charged $500 worth of telephone calls to various accounts); FBI Seizes Computers Tied
to NASA 'Break-in,' San Francisco Chron., July 17, 1984, at 4, col. 1 (four teenagers pene-
trated the computer systems at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center); Emmons, FBI Pulls
Plug on Boys' Game of Computer Tap, LA. Times, Oct. 14, 1983, at UI-1, col. 5, 11-3, col. 1;
Goldfarb, New Breed of Computer Crime, The Recorder, Oct. 19,1983, at 1, col. 3; Computer
Peeper Invades NASA Files, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 17, 1983, at 3, col. 5 (juveniles in.
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puter literacy and the availability of terminals in homes and
schools have increased, juveniles ranging from thirteen to eigh-
teen have entered the realm of computer crime,4 by unlawfully
entering the electronic files of banks, the sensitive defense records
of the federal government, the medical research data files of hos-
pitals, and the computerized ticket information of airlines.5
Computer crimes committed by juveniles have largely been con-
fined to "hacking," defined as the unauthorized electronic acces-
sing of another's computer system without the intent to defraud
or to steal any "property" within the data base.6 Those who en-
gage in such conduct are known as "hackers."7
This note examines the problem of juvenile computer crime, de-
scribes existing federal and state criminal laws available to punish
and deter hackers, and analyzes why these statutes are inadequate
to deal with the problem. The note then proposes civil liability as
vaded TELENET's Telemail System, the international computer message network, with
damage estimated between $500,000 and $1,000,000. The Defense Department's computer
files may also have been penetrated); Stone, Young Computer Whiz Freed from Charges,
San Francisco Chron., Sept. 3, 1983, at 2, col. 1 (teenager raidedhigh school computer, caus-
ing $450 in damage); D. PARKER, FIGHTING COMPUTER CRIME 140-43 (1983) (15-year-old
male arrested for destroying student computer programs in the University of California's
UNIX system); id. at 144-47 (four 13-year-old students at a New York high school raided
the computer systems of 21 organizations in the United States and Canada); id. at 148-52
(two high school students played "cat and mouse" with DePaul University officials, threat-
ening to crash the college's system if access to a special computer file was not given; damage
amounted to $22,000).
4. Testimony of Oregon Rep. Ron Wyden in Hearings on Computer and Communica-
tions Security and Privacy, supra note 1, at 5 (stating that with the computerization of
society, the United States is witnessing "the development of a new concept of lawbreaking.
One of its most tragic and profound implications is that it attracts some of the brightest
young people who seem to fail to recognize the ethical and moral implications of their ac-
tions."). See also Testimony of Donn Parker in id. at 75, and in Federal Computer Systems
Protection AcL" Hearings on H.R. 3970 Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on HR. 3970].
5. Gerber, Crime and (No) Punishment Computers, Criminals and the Law, TODAY:
THE VIDEoTEX COMPUTER MAGAziNE, Nov./Dec. 1982, at 7. See also Sokolik, Computer
Crime-The Need for Deterrent Legislation, 2 COMPuTER/L. J. 353, 358-59 (1980).
6. Sandberg-Diment, How the 'Hackers' Are Butchering Language, San Francisco
Chron., Sept. 28, 1983, at A2, col. 4.
Computer experts distinguish between benign hacking and malicious hacking. Benign
hacking is the use of computer files which one does have authority to enter, while malicious
hacking is considered criminal conduct and is the intentional and unauthorized access of
another's computer that has resulted in "various acts of vandalism such as destroying or
contaminating date or use of computer service." Hearings on Computer and Communica-
tions Security and Privacy, supra note 1, at 74 (testimony of Donn Parker). This note's
references to hacking are to malicious hacking.
7. Hearings on Computer and Communications Security and Privacy, supra note 1,
at 74 (testimony of Donn Parker).
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an alternative to criminal prosecution in curbing teenage hacking,
and evaluates the feasibility of this suggested remedy.
H1
The Problem: Hacking
Most juveniles view hacking as a game, with any data system
that a teenager may access via a telephone being the playing field.'
Law enforcement agencies, in contrast, view hacking as a crime of
breaking and entering into another's property, with the computer
being the instrumentality of the crime. Security experts consider
it comparable to joyriding in another's car.'
Security experts have been surprised at how easily hackers have
accessed their systems. The teenage hacker can penetrate a sys-
tem with only "a home computer, a modem (an inexpensive device
that allows computers to transmit data over the phone lines), and
a modicum of computer literacy."10 Once the juvenile is online, he
or she can roam at will, traveling across state lines and interna-
tional boundaries.1
Although this activity has received much attention, particularly
in the print media, within the last few years,' some individuals
have questioned the seriousness of juvenile hacking, arguing that
the media has sensationalized the problem. Indeed, the prevailing
public view is of hacking as high school antics, and of the hackers
as pranksters who will eventually grow up.' Juvenile hackers
8. Marbach, supra note 1, at 42; Cancer Hospitbasi Computer Invaded-'ust Jor
Thrils' San Francisco Chron, Aug. 20, 1983, at 13, coL 1.
9. Ferraro, FBI Is Seeking New Laws to Combat Computer Crimes, The Recorder, Oct.
19, 1983, at 1, cols. 3-4; Computer Whiz Says It's Easy to Break In, San Francisco Chron.
Sept. 27, 1983, at 6, col. 3.
10. Marbach, supra note 1, at 43.
ii. The Milwaukee teenagers, who dubbed themselves the "414s" because of the area
code in their vicinity, raided computers in California, New York. Texas, and Canada. See
supro note L
12. See generally Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 1 col. 3. Computer Peepers Invade NASA
File, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 17, 1983, at 3, col 3; Emmons, supra note 3, at U-1. col. 5;
Computer whiz kids broke up cancer patients' monitoring system, San Francisco Exam-
iner, Aug. 18, 1983, at AS, coL 1; Marbach, supa note 1, at 42; Prankster% Pirates and Pen
Po/ls, TIME, May 3, 1982, at 54.
Cartoonists have also romanticized teenage hackers. See Berke Breathed's "Bloom
County" series, San Francisco Chron., Sept. 26-30, 1983, Alexander, editorial cartoon. San
Francisco Examiner, Aug. 17,1982, at B2. The entertainment industry has also given media
exposure to the hackers. The movie WarGaines and the television program Whiz Kids
have popularized the conduct. See Adams. A dose of reality hit8fantasy Qfcompuem. San
Francisco Examiner, Aug. 17, 1983, at B9, col 1.
13. Computer Whiz Sals It's Easy to Break In, supra note 9, at 6. eoL L Parents of
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have also been hailed as heroes, because of their ability to control
machines programmed by adults. When juveniles leave 'Trojan
Horses""' in the system to plague the computer programmer or
user, or tell others how to get into various systems undetected,
they are often dubbed "whiz kids," or are glorified as "Robin
Hoods of the Information Age."'" Both juveniles and adults ad-
mire their "creativity." Adolescents often rationalize their behav-
ior with the argument that computers are inanimate objects, and
thus, no real harm can result when they break in and play withthe system."
However, the consequences of this public attitude may be seri-
ous. The potential for destruction of significant data, such as med-
ical and financial information, is of great concern to computer
users.17 Until now, hacking has caused only property damage. No
deaths or personal injuries have resulted from this teenage pas-
time, but the possibilities of such dangerous consequences do ex-
ist.1' On one occasion, for example, hackers entered into the
computerized hospital records of intensive care patients and in-
creased the dosage of prescribed medication by one hundred per-
cent. If a nurse had not spotted the increase, death to several
hackers have defended their children as "exuberant, innocent pranksters." D. PARKER,
supra note 3, at 148-42
14. '"Tojan Horses" are additional instructions or modifications introduced into com-
puter programs. These additions or changes are executed "along with normal and expected
activity." D. PARKER, supra note 3, at 84. Hackers believe that the results caused by their
"Trojan Horses" will not be detected and will be received as "routine output." IS "Trojan
Horses" can be inserted so cleverly that their presence in a program can go unnoticed. It
"could require many days or weeks of an expert programmer's time" to find their locations
if their "presence were suspected." IM at 86. These additions or modifications can be segre-
gated from "innocuous-looking data" in such a way that they can be easily erased after they
are used. Id In such a situation, a programmer would have to find "the instructions that
[created] the instructions that performed the ultimate unauthorized act." Id "Trojan Hor-
ses" can also be camouflaged "as inconspicuous little subprograms or data that look as if
they have some other, legitimate purpose." Id Apart from "trojan Horses," programmers
can also be plagued by other "[u]nauthorized covert methods of altering the processing in
computers." Id at 84. These include altering input data ("data diddling'), using system
anomolies ("trapdoors")' and "changing the order in which functions are to be performed
or repeating functions" ("asynchronous attack"). Id
15. Marbach, supra note 1, at 46, 48.
1& Gerber, supra note 5, at 1.
17. Computer Whiz Says It Easy to Break In, supra note 9, at 6, col. 1. The potential
threat of hacking has even forced the Pentagon to reevaluate its computer security. Penta-
gon 7re, to Protect Its omputer, San Francisco Chron., Sept. 26,1983, at 1,16, col. 1. Some
corporations have also taken similar measures. New Wave Computer Crime, supra note 1.
at 45.
18 129 CONG. REC. E2709 (daily ed. June 6, 1983) (Clifton Garrot's Comment in Balti-
more Sun, June 6, 1M submitted by Rep. Sam Gejdenson).
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patients might have resulted. 9
The costs of hacking, in terms of data destruction or alteration,
disruption of vital services, and wasted computer time, are diffi-
cult to assess, especially if the hackers are never detected or ap-
prehended. It has been estimated that hacking damage to
computer users ranges from $450 to $500,000. 20 In actuality, the
true losses are incalculable because computer users do not want
their customers and the general public to know that their systems
have been penetrated. Some financial and corporate institutions
do not even report computer intrusions for fear of losing busi-
ness.2 The amounts of damages from these unreported entries
have therefore been left undisclosed. In addition, computer crime,
as a new phenomenon, has only recently gained significant atten-
tion from those likely to keep such statistics, such as security ex-
perts and law enforcement officials.'
Some claim that frequent change of the computer system's pass-
words may be sufficient to deter juvenile computer perpetrators.3
Such measures, however, may inhibit only the weak-hearted
hacker, and may "intensify the security battle and offer new chal-
lenges to determined hackers."2' Hacking is an addictive game;
the more challenging it is, the more fascinating the competition
19. Id.
20. When Robert Nelson, Jr. crashed his high school's computer, it cost $450 to restore
the system. Stone, supra note 3, at 2, col. 2. The damage caused by the six teenagers ar-
rested by the FBI on October 14, 1983, was estimated at a minimum of $500,000. Crackdown
on computer data tapper, San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 14, 1983, at A3, col. 2. When the
Milwaukee 414s' intrusion destroyed the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center's "users
account file," the teenagers cost the center about $1500 in revenue. Computer whiz kids
broke up cancer patients' monitoring system, San Francisco Examiner, Aug. 18,1983, at AS,
col. 4.
21. Marbach, supra note 1, at 46; Volgyes, The Investigation, Prosecution, and Preven-
tion of Computer Crime: A State-of-the-Art Review, 2 COMPUTER/L. J. 385, 388 (1980);
Sokolik, supra note 5, at 359.
22. Recent attention has been focused on computer crime because of the growing de-
pendence on computers to store information by businesses and government organizations.
Sokolik, supra note 5, at 359.
The growth of computer literacy has also added to this concern. More and more students
are being taught to use computers. Approximately 100,000 computers were in U.S. schools
in 1982, roughly one for every 400 students. By 1985, it is estimated that there will be
300,000 to 650,000 computers in schools. Golden, Here Come the Microkids, TmE, May 3,
1982, at 53-54. As a result of this growing computer literacy, it is predictable that juvenile
computer crime will increase.
23. Computer Crime: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Hearing on Computer Crime) (statement of Kansas Rep. Dan Glickman).
24. Computer Whiz Says It's Easy to Break In, supra note 9.
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against the system becomes. 25 The ultimate mastery is the defeat
of the security system.
Although there are high security systems, such as scramblers
and "special keys containing built-in microchips that can be
programmed with secret codes" to prevent unauthorized entry,26
these security measures are presently affordable only to the mili-
tary, banks, and other large corporate institutions, and remain be-
yond the financial means of most small businesses, nonprofit
medical facilities, and local public institutions.' Wells Fargo
Bank, for example, allocates in excess of eleven million dollars a
year on security,28 and Grumman Aerospace calculated that over
one million dollars will be spent "in hardware alone for encryp-
tion devices in order to protect [its] data as it goes out on the tele-
communication lines," as well as "additional money in [the] form
of people to put up software packages for protection of the data
within the system."'
Others have argued that the hacking problem should be re-
solved by educating the potential hacker, rather than by resorting
to the legal process. One suggestion has been that computer eth-
ics, including the idea that use of another's data base is stealing,s°
should be taught to the young. It has been suggested further that
the potential dangers of hacking should be. stressed. The lessons
of computer ethics, however, may prove fruitless as long as adoles-
cent hackers are hailed as heroes."1 Juvenile computer crime will
only be deterred when there is public censure of the conduct and a
corresponding adequate legal regulation of this activity. 2
25. Golden, supra note 22, at 52; D. PARKER, supra note 3, at 131.
26. New Wave Computer Crime, supra note 1, at 45.
27. Id. See also Computer and Communications Security and Privacy: Hearing Before
the Subcommittee on Transportation, Aviation and Materials of the House Committee on
Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 2d Seass. 122 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Hearing on
Computer and Communications] (statement of Joseph B. Thompkins, Jr., Chairperson of
the ABA Task Force on Computer Crime).
28. Hearings on Computer and Communications Security and Privacy, supra note 1,
at 490 (statement of Jack L. Hancock, Senior Vice President of Wells Fargo and Company).
29. Id. at 495 (statement of Julius Cohen, Director of Technology, Information Re-
source Management Department, Grumman Aerospace Corporation).
30. Gerber, supra note 5, at 1; 129 CoNG. REC. E5090 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1983) (statement
of Alabama Rep. Ben Erdeich).
31. Marbach, supra note 1, at 48.
32. Legal regulation and punishment of this misconduct will be a signal to teenagers
that hacking is no longer socially acceptable. See War Declared on Computer Invaders, San
Francisco Chron., Feb. 2, 1984, at 10, col. 1.
[Vol. 7
No. 2] JUVENILE COMPUTER CRIME
III
The Existing Computer Crime Statutes
Thirty-three states have computer crime laws. 33 Congress en-
acted a federal statute only recently.3' Nevertheless, the current
state and federal computer-related crime statutes do not ade-
quately address the problem of teenage hacking.
A. State Law
1. Attributes of the State Computer Crime Statutes
Thirty-three states have enacted computer crime statutes, all
since 1978.' Some states adopted their computer crime laws in
reaction to the growing opportunities for fraud, theft, and destruc-
tion of financial instruments, data and other assets contained in
the data bases of government and financial institutions.36
33. The 33 states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Wash-
ington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. The Alaska statute is unusual because it merely prohib-
its the unlawful deception of a machine, which includes the computer. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.46.985 (1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2301, -2316 (1982); CAL. PENAL CODE § 502
(Deering Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-5.5-101 to -102 (Supp. 1982); Act of May 31,
1984, Pub. Act No. 84-206, 1984 Conn. Pub. Acts; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 858 (Supp. 1982);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 815.01-.06 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9-90 to -95 (1982);
Act of July 1, 1984, Act No. 220, 1984 Hawaii Acts 12th Legis. (to be codified at HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 708(1984)); IDAHO CODE § 18-2201 (Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 16-9
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); Act of May 10, 1984 Iowa Acts (to be codified at IOWA CODE
§ 716A (1984)); 1984 Md. Laws ch. 588 at 3037-40; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 30 (West
1984); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.529 (Callaghan 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.87-.89 (West
Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 569.093-.099 (Vernon Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-
2-101, 45-6-310 to -311 (1983); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 205.473-.480 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-
16A-1 to -4 (1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-453 to -457 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1.08
(Supp. 1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2901.01, 2913.01 (Page Supp. 1984); Act of Mar. 26,
1984, 1984 Okla. Sess. Laws (to be codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 1951-1956 (1984)); PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3933 (Purdon Supp. 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-52-2 to -5 (Supp. 1983);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 43-43B-1 to -7 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3-1401 to -1406
(Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-701 to -704 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-152.1-
152.14 (Supp. 1984); Computer Trespass ch. 273, 1984 Wash. Laws 1484-1488 (to be codified
at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.48, 9A.52, 9A.56 (1984)); WIsC. STAT. ANN. § 943.70 (West Supp.
1983); Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-3-501 to -505 (1983).
34. See infra notes 75, 88-89.
35. Arizona, Florida, and Alaska passed their statutes in 1978. Seven states, California,
Colorado, Illinois, New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Utah adopted their laws
in 1979. Michigan was the only state to do so in 1980. In 1981, Montana and Georgia fol-
lowed, and in 1982, Delaware, Minnesota, Missouri, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Wyo-
rning joined the group. The other states followed in 1983 and 1984. See aupmr note 33.
36. Florida and Georgia legislatures expressed this specific intent to combat such white
collar crime in their statutes. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 815.02 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE
COMM/ENT L. J.
Another impetus for the enactment of such legislation was the
desire to supplement the traditional laws against theft, embezzle-
ment, larceny, and fraud by wire, in which there were loopholes
through which computer crimes might slip.'1 For example, it has
been suggested' that the Colorado legislature passed its computer
crime statute in reaction to the state supreme court's decision in
People v. Home Insurance Co." In that case, the state's highest
court held that no theft was involved in the procurement over a
wire of confidential medical information concerning hospital pa-
tients, without physical removal of any of these records from the
hospital, because confidentiality is not a "thing of value" within
the meaning of the theft statute.4 Absent the legislature's action,
the theft statute might well have proved inapplicable to the case
of an electronic intruder entering into a computer system and
looking at confidential files. 1 It is likely that the Colorado statute
was enacted to cover such a possibility.'
The state computer crime statutes are generally similar to each
other,43, with a few notable variations. One difference is the mens
rea required for conviction." The jurisdictions use a variety of
terms to, describe what state of mind is required to establish a vio-
lation. Thus, Arizona requires that the offender act "intention-
ally, ' 45  while Florida forbids criminal conduct performed
"willfully, knowingly,"'  and Colorado merely uses the term
"knowingly."'47 The California and New Mexico statutes, requir-
ing a higher standard of proof than the other states, reach actions
done "maliciously."" None of the computer crime statutes pro-
ANN. § 16-9-91 (1982); see also Act of July 1, 1984, Act No. 220, Hawaii Acts 12th Legis. (to
be codified at HAWAII REv. STAT. § 708 (1984)). The other statutes were passed for similar
reasons.
37. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 815.02(4) (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9950(a)
(1983); 1979 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 858 § 1 (Deering); Statement of J.D. MacFarlane,
Attorney General of Colorado, in Computer Systems Protection Act of 1979, Hearing on S.
240 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the Senate Committee on the Judici-
ary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Hearing on S. 240].
38. Hearing on S. 240, supra note 37, at 12-13 (statement of J.D. MacFarlane).
39. 197 Colo. 260, 591 P.2d 1036 (1979).
40. Id. at 262, 591 P.2d at 1037.
41. Hearing on S. 240, supra note 37, at 12-13 (statement of J.D. MacFarlane).
42. Id.
43. See generally supra note 33.
44. Id.
45. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-216(B) (1982).
46. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 815.04-.06 (West Supp. 1983).
47. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 18-5.5-102 (1982).
48. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(c) (Deering Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16A-4
(1982).
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vides further definition of these terms.49 Their meanings must be
gleaned from the state's general statutory definitions for criminal
culpability or the jurisdiction's case law.5°
In general, "intentionally" can be defined to mean that the per-
son entered the computer system without authorization and with
the purpose of causing the result or of engaging in the conduct.51
"Willfully" can be defined as synonymous with either "intention-
ally" or "knowingly," depending on the state's statutory scheme or
case law.-2 A computer invader acts "knowingly" when he or she
is aware that the conduct is practically certain or reasonably cer-
tain to cause the result that is prohibited by the computer crime
statute." If "knowingly" is defined as knowledge that is "reason-
ably certain," rather than "practically certain," direct proof that
49. See generally supra note 33.
50. See itfm notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
51. In its general statutory explanations of criminal intent terms, Arizona defines "in-
tentionally" to mean "with respect to a result or to a conduct described by a statute defin-
ing an offense, that a person's objective Is to cause that result or to engage in that conduct."
AIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-105(a) (Supp. 1982).
52. A Florida court of appeal in Rozier v. Florida, 402 So. 2d 539, 542-43 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981), defined "willfully" when used in a general intent crime, such as trespassing, to
mean that "the entry or remaining [was done] intentionally, knowingly, and purposefully."
The Rozier court found knowledge to be a component of the mens rea required. Id There-
fore, "willfully, knowingly" as used in the Florida computer crime statute has the same
meaning as "wilfully." See also State v. Buffett, 397 So. 2d 1060, 1061 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981) (the court in this.grand theft case found "[it. .. difficult to see that the addition of
the word 'knowingly' to the requirement of 'with intent' adds anything to the statute. Put-
ting the two together, 'knowingly with intent' seems to be a mere repetition."). Using these
arguments, it can be concluded that "willfully, knowingly" means "willfully."
Florida case law also treats 'intentionally" and "willfully" synonymously. See Roziter,
402 So. 2d at 542-43. See also Linehan v. State, 442 So. 2d 244, 247 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
Under Utah law, "wilfully" has the same definition as "intentionally." UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 76--703, 76-2-103(1) (Supp. 1983). A person acts "[i]ntentionally, or with intent or will-
fully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-2-103(1).
53. Under the Colorado statute,
[a] person acts "knowingly".. . with respect to conduct or to a circumstance de-
scribed by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of
such nature or that such circumstances exists. A person acts "knowingly"...
with respect to a result of his conduct, when he is aware that his conduct is practi-
cally certain to cause the result.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1-501(6) (1978). In Colorado, "knowingly" has the same definition as
"willfully," but differs from "intentionally." ISE According to the Colorado Supreme
Court, "knowingly" is the second highest level of criminal culpability. People v. Derrerra,
667 P2d 1363, 1367 (Colo. 1983). "Intentionally" is the highest level of criminal culpability
in Colorado. See Cow. REV. STAT. § 18-1-501(5) (1978). "A person acts 'intentionally' or
'with intent' when his conscious objective is to cause the specific result proscribed by the
statute defining the offense." I& This culpable mental state is applied only to specific in-
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the person knew that the act was illegal is not necessary; it may be
inferred from the facts using a reasonable person standard."4 "In-
tentionally" may require a slightly higher standard of proof of in-
tent than "knowingly," depending on the jurisdictional
definitions.5' A computer perpetrator behaves "maliciously" if he
or she has a wish to vex, annoy, or injure, or the intent to do a
wrongful act described by the computer crime law.'
The states vary in their classification of computer offenses as
misdemeanors or felonies, and in the prison terms and fines they
impose.57 In some states, the amount of theft or damage plays an
tent crimes, while knowingly" and "willfully" apply only to general intent crimes. Id.; see
also supra note 52.
Utah defines "knowingly" separately from "willfully" and "intentionally." UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-2-103(1)-(2) (Supp. 1983). Under Utah law, "a person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is
reasonably certain to cause the result." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-103(2) (Supp. 1983). See
supra note 52, for definitions of "intentionally" and "willfully" under Utah law.,
54. The Nevada statute uses such a statement in its definition of "knowingly." NEV.
REV. STAT. § 193.010(12) (1983). Nevada is another state which uses "knowingly" in its
computer crime statute. NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 205.4767-.477 (1983).
55. See supra note 53.
56. California defines "malicious" intent as the "wish to vex, annoy, or injure... or an
intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law." CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 7(4) (Deering 1971). This latter state of mind is more difficult to prove than
the others. For example, the District Attorney's Office in Santa Clara County, California,
was unable to bring charges against an 18-year-old hacker who had raided a high school's
computer, because the office could not prove that the boy had entered the system "mali-
ciously" to access or damage school records. Stone, supra note 3, at 2, col. 1. If the statute
had required the conduct to be done "intentionally" or "knowingly," the prosecutor's case
would have been stronger. The juvenile admitted to "knowingly" accessing the school's
electronic data file. He claimed that his intent had been to enter the school's online system
in order to create a better security system. Id. col 2. In response to this situation, the
California legislature recently amended and expanded its computer crime statute. The
statute continues to require that the conduct be done "maliciously" when fraud is involved
but requires that the violator act only "intentionally" when the conduct does not involve
fraud. CA. PEN CODE § 502 (Deering 1985).
57. Note, Addresing Computer Crime Leglatio" Progress and Regress, 4 COMPUTER/
L. J. 195, 203 (1982). For example, the North Dakota law makes no distinction in classifica-
tion. All computer crimes are felonies, and anyone found guilty under this law may be
subjected to a maximum ten-year Jail sentence or $10,000 fine, or both, for a Class B felony,
or a maximum five years in prison or a fine no greater than $5000, or both, for a Class C
felony. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1.08 (Supp. 1984).
In contrast, the Colorado statute classifies computer offenses as either misdemeanors or
felonies, and thus permits more gradation of the offenses. COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-5.5-102(3)
(Supp. 1982). It provides that If the damage is less than $200, the offense is a misdemeanor.
Md. The court may impose a prison term between three months and twelve months, or a
fine between $5 and $1000, or both. COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1-106 (Supp. 1982). If the dam-
age is $200 or more, the court will hold the offender liable for a felony. COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 18-5.5102(3) (Supp. 1982). Colorado law prescribes a prison term from two to eight years
fnr enrouter felonies. COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1-105 (Supp. 1982).
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important factor in determining both the length of imprisonment
or the amount of fine." In other states, punishment is determined
by the type of computer crime that has been committed, for exam-
ple, fraud, trespass, invasion of privacy, and/or theft of computer
services.59 A few states have not enacted separate computer crime
statutes, but have amended their larceny or fraud and theft laws
to encompass illegal access and use of computers.Y°
2. State Law Application to Hacking
The state computer crime statutes cover a variety of computer
offenses ranging from "schemes or artifice to defraud or extort or
* . . [obtain] money, property, or services," to intentionally enter-
ing, accessing, modifying, eliminating, destroying, or damaging
data in a computer file, without authorization.61 Although these
state laws were initially designed to reach potential professional
computer criminals, such as computer bank robbers, and possibly
computer saboteurs and spies eliciting trade secrets from data ba-
ses,62 juvenile hacking does fall within the statutes. Ostensibly,
the hacker fits the description of one who "intentionally," "will-
fully [and] knowingly," "knowingly," or "maliciously" accesses, al-
ters, deletes, damages, or destroys any computer system, computer
network, computer program, or data."
The recently enacted Virginia statute and the amended Califor-
nia law specifically focus on hacking. The Virginia law expressly
makes several important aspects of hacking--computer trespass,
computer invasion of privacy, and theft of computer services-a
58. See, e.g., Colorado, Minnesota, Utah, and Iowa statutes, supra note 33.
59. For example, the Virginia statute breaks down computer crime into several catego-
ries, including computer fraud, trespass, invasion of privacy, and theft of computer services.
VA. CODE §§ 18.2-152.1-152.14 (Supp. 1984). Delaware has two types of computer crime:
fraud and misuse. Both types are considered felonies, although of differing degrees. DEL
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 858 (Supp. 1982). New Mexico labels the illegal activity as either com-
puter fraud or unauthorized computer use. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-16A-1 to .4 (1982).
North Carolina divides computer crime into four types: (1) unauthorized computer access,
(2) damaging computers and related materials, (3) denial of computer services to an author-
ized user, and (4) extortion. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-453 to -457 (1981).
60. See Massachusett's amended larceny statute, MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 266, § 30
(West 1984), and Ohio's amended fraud and theft statute, OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2901.01,
2913.01 (Page Supp. 1984).
61. See generally supra note 33, particularly the California and Delaware statutes.
62. See supra text accompanying note 36.
63. See supra note 33, to see the similarity of the computer crime statutes of Arizona,
New Mexico, Delaware, Georgia, Michigan, Tennessee, North Dakota, South Dakota, Mis-
souri, and Wyoming. See also supra notes 45-48.
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crime." Similarly, the California computer statute was amended
to cover juvenile hacking with the inclusion of the following provi-
sion: "Any person who intentionally and without authorization ac-
cesses any computer system, computer network, computer
program, or data, with knowledge that the access was not author-
ized, shall be guilty of a public offense.""
While the state computer crime statutes contemplate hacking,
they inadequately address juvenile computer crime. With few ex-
ceptions, such as the California and Virginia statutes, most of the
state laws were primarily enacted not to prevent juvenile hacking,
but rather to deal with professional computer criminals who com-
mit financial fraud, embezzlement, and theft.' Since hacking is
not considered as harmful as computer fraud or theft, 7 there has
been an apparent reluctance to prosecute juveniles under statutes
specifically designed to punish adults for serious computer
crimes.6s
While the criminal penalties of most state statutes may need ad-
justment to reflect hacking's relatively less serious nature in rela-
tion to other computer offenses, they must also remain sufficient
to deter the activity. States could follow the examples set by Cali-
fornia and Virginia, whose statutes provide only fines in some
cases of computer crime, such as computer "browsing" and inva-
sion of privacy. 9
Since only thirty-three states have enacted computer crime leg-
islation,70 several states provide no protection. 71 When a teenage
hacker sits at a terminal in a state with a computer crime statute
and enters a system in another jurisdiction without statutory pro-
64. VA. CODE §§ 18.2-152.4 to -152.6 (Supp. 1984).
65. The California legislature amended § 502 to encompass such language. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 502(e) (Deering Supp. 1985).
66. See supra text accompanying note 36.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 8-16.
68. It may be considered harsh to sentence a teenager to two to four years for "know-
ingly" accessing a computer system and causing $500 worth of damage when the system
crashes, as the Colorado law requires. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5.5-105 (Supp. 1982). The
result could be even worse in Delaware, where "intentional" computer misuse is a Class E
felony, punishable by several years imprisonment, or in Rhode Island, where such com-
puter abuse could result in up to five years in prison or a $5000 fine, or both. DELA. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 858 (Supp. 1982); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-52-5 (Supp. 1983).
The public may consider it unreasonable to expose a juvenile to any possibility of such
harsh punishment. This public attitude may explain the reluctance or lack of prosecution
of juvenile hackers under the computer crime statutes.
69. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (Deering Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 18.2.152.5 (Supp. 1984).
70. See upra note 33.
71. New York, Texas, and Kansas, for example, have no computer crime statutes.
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tection, he or she has committed a crime only in the state with the
computer crime statute.72 If that jurisdiction fails to prosecute,
the other state which has no computer crime law may not assert
territorial criminal jurisdiction.73 If the communication occurs be-
tween a terminal and data base both of which are located in sepa-
rate states without computer crime legislation, the juvenile cannot
be prosecuted in either state.74
B. Federal Law
When juvenile hacking crosses state lines and thereby inter-
feres with interstate commerce, those jurisdictions without appli-
cable computer crime, theft, or wire fraud statutes may look to
federal law. Although federal legislation had been introduced as
early as 1977, Congress only recently enacted a federal computer
crime statute.75
Prior to the enactment of this statute, interstate computer of-
fenses had been prosecuted primarily under the Federal Wire
Fraud Statute,76 which provides for the prosecution of anyone who
devises a "scheme or artifice to defraud," to take under "false or
72. Most of the state statutes do not discuss where the computer crime must occur in
order for a state to have competent jurisdiction. See generally supra note 33. However, at
least one state, Connecticut, in its recently enacted computer statute, addressed this issue.
Act of May 31, 1984, Pub. Act No. 84-206, 1984 Conn. Pub. Acts. In sum, the offense is
deemed to have been committed in Connecticut if "any act performed in furtherance of the
[computer crime] occurs in this state or if any computer system or part thereof accessed in
violation of [the statute] is located in this state." I& § 12.
See also W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw 117-25 (1972), for a
discussion of territorial criminal jurisdiction. Under the common law territorial theory of
jurisdiction, a crime had only one situs, namely "where the vital act or result occurred,"
and that only the place of situs had jurisdiction. Id at 118-19. In a number of states, statu-
tory extensions of territorial jurisdiction have abolished this common law notion. Thus,
some states by statute may assert "jurisdiction to punish conduct within the state causing a
bad result to occur outside the state." I& at 122. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2901.11
(Page 1982); CAL. PENAL CODE § 778a (Deering 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 1-5 (Smith-
Hurd 1972).
73. Generally, if no state statute makes a conduct illegal, and such c iduct is not con-
sidered a common law crime, there is no crime to prosecute. W. LAFAVE & A. Sco'r, JR.,
supra note 72, at 57.
74. See generally discussion supra notes 72-73; see also 129 CONG. REC. H9766 (daily ed.
Nov. 12, 1983) (speech of Florida Rep. Bill Nelson).
75. Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L No. 98-473, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98
Stat.) 2190 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030). See inf'ra note 89, for a history of this federal
computer crime statute.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976). Although 40 federal statutes have been identified as con-
ceivably applicable to computer related crime, the Federal Wire Fraud Statute is more com-
monly used because most computer crime occurs over a wire. Hearing on 9 240, supra note
37, at 51, 161.
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fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises," the money or
property of another "by means of wire, radio, or television com-
munication in interstate or foreign commerce."77 Such a convicted
offender shall be "fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.178
For several reasons, the Federal Wire Fraud Statute is and was
an inadequate solution to the juvenile hacking problem.79 First, it
is difficult to prove the requisite mens rea. Hacking does not en-
tail the intent to defraud or to obtain money; teenagers instead
seek entertainment when they penetrate electronic data bases.8°
The establishment of intent is difficult. When a hacker inten-
tionally accesses a computer system, he or she is also using an-
other's valuable computer time. This value vests the computer
time with a property-like aspect.8 " Therefore, the intent to use
another's computer time is arguably equivalent to the intent to
take property. This analogy works only if it is established that the
hacker knew of the "fraudulent nature" of his act.'2 As previously
noted, however, neither hackers nor the general public commonly
perceive hacking as "fraudulent."8 3
Another problem with using the Federal Wire Fraud Statute is
that the computer cases that have been prosecuted under this law
have generally involved actions in which the defendant used the
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See 129 CONG. Rnc. H165 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983) (speech of Florida Rep. Bill Nel-
son about the loopholes in the existing laws); Hearings on HR. 3970, supra note 4, at 12
(statement of William A. Bayse, Assistant Director, Technical Services Division, FBI).
80. Cancer Hospital's Computer Invaded-'Just for Thrifls,'supra note 8, at 13, col. 1.
81. Although state courts have refused to "regard the use of a computer as a property
interest" where no statute specifically defines computer time as such an asset, the
"[flederal courts have taken an expansive approach and view computer time and services as
property subjected to theft." Comment, Legislative Issues in Computer Crime, 21 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 239, 251-52 (1984).
See United States v. Kelley, 507 F. Supp. 495, 499 (E.D. Penn. 1981) (holding that
defendents' use of computer time and computer storage of their employer's system, even
without the intent to obtain money, was a scheme to defraud "their employer of honest and
faithful performance of their duties as employees"). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 502
(Deering 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5.5-101(8) (Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 858(c)(4) (Supp. 1982) (examples of computer crime statutes that define "property"). See
also 129 CONG. Rzc. H165 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983), for Rep. Nelson's comments regarding
computer time: "The damage of illegal entry can only be measured by actual minutes or
seconds... ." See also Ingraham, On Charging Computer Crime, 2 COMPUTER/L. J. 429,
434 (1980) for a discussion of how computer offenses can be prosecuted under non-com-
puter crime statutes.
82. 507 F. Supp. at 503.
83. See supra text accompanying note 13.
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data base for financial gain. 4 Therefore, there may be no solid
precedent for prosecution where entry is for recreational enjoy-
ment, and law enforcement officials may be reluctant to file
charges.
Finally, the penalties available under the Federal Wire Fraud
Statute may be inadequate and inappropriate to the conduct. The
maximum fine of $1,000 is inadequate punishment to compensate
fully the victim's losses.85 Also, as with the state statutes, the un-
graded prison sentence could prove too harsh to impose on a con-
victed teenage hacker, even if first time offenders would receive
only one year in prison. Any federal jail sentence, regardless of
the length, may be viewed as overly punitive to impose on a juve-
nile, in view of the current social acceptance of teenage hacking."
With computers permeating all aspects of American society-
records management, banking, marketing, law enforcement, and
national defense-and the growing potential for computer abuse,
as demonstrated by the antics of the computer hackers, congres-
sional concern about the adequacy of existing federal laws to cope
with computer crime has increased.8 7 Congress's concern
prompted the passage of the "Counterfeit Access Device and Com-
puter Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984" (1984 Act)," after three ear-
lier attempts.8 9
84. For example, in United States v. Seldlitz, 589 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1978), the defendant
accessed the computer system of his former place of employment to copy a multi-million
dollar software program for use at his own computer firm. See also United States v. Muni,
668 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Giovengo, 637 F.2d 941 (3rd Cr. 1980).
85. 129 CONG. REC. H165 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983) (speech of Florida Rep. Bill Nelson).
86. See infra note 89, regarding the reluctance of imposing ungraded criminal penal-
ties against amateurs, and supra text accompanying note 13, concerning the social accept-
ance of teenage hacking.
87. Hearings on Computer and Communications Security and Privacy, supra note 1,
at 1-2 (statement of Kansas Rep. Dan Glickman); H.. REP. No. 894,98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-
12 (1984). See also Hearing on Computer and Communications, supra note 27, at 86-87
(statement of Robert P. Campbell, President of Advanced Information Management, Inc.).
88. Act of Oct. 12, 1984, supra note 75.
89. Federal Computer Systems Protection Act of 1977 (1977 Act), S. 1766, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1977); Federal Computer Systems Protection Act of 1979 (1979 Act), S. 240, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Federal Computer Systems Protection Act of 1981 (1981 Act), H.R.
3970, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
The 1979 Act (like its predecessor, the 1977 Act) was criticized on several grounds: (1) the
statute provided for an unnecessary expansion of "federal jurisdiction into areas tradition-
ally reserved for the States"; (2) the incidence of computer crime did not warrant a federal
statute; and (3) the proposed law exposed individuals to criminal liability for possible inno-
cent conduct, such as accidental entry. Hearing on S. 240, spra note 37, at 3 (statement of
J.D. MacFarlane). Even supporters of the 1979 Act, including private industries, govern-
ment agencies, and legal professionals, recognized the validity of these criticisms. I& at
108-29, 138-52. The American Bar Association (ABA) strongly recommended that the stat-
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The statute makes it illegal for anyone to "knowingly" access a
computer without authorization' for any of three purposes: (1) to
"disclose" and "use" information about the country's "national de-
fense or foreign relations, or any restricted data, as defined in par-
agraph r of section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954," with the
intent to injure the United States or to give any foreign nation an
advantage; (2) to obtain "information contained in financial
records of a financial institution," as defined by the Right to Fi-
nancial Privacy Act of 1978, or "contained in a file of a consumer
reporting agency on a consumer," as defined by the Fair Credit
Reporting Act; or (3) to knowingly modify, destroy, or prevent
the use of data in any computer "operated for or on behalf of the
Government of the United States."91
ute provide for concurrent federal/state jurisdiction, with published guidelines precisely
defining when the federal government could exercise jurisdiction. Hearing on S. 240, supra
note 37, at 113 (resolution of the ABA). The ABA also resolved that a five-year maximum
prison sentence for all offenses covered under the 1979 Act would be more reasonable than
a 15-year maximum penalty that was devoid of "any structure of gradation to guide the
exercise of the sentencing authority." I& n.2. A 15-year sentence could prove too severe,
especially if applied to amateurs or first time offenders. IdL at 113. The Electronic Funds
Transfer Association (EFTA) further recommended that the act should be amended to
guarantee that only wrongful access and not accidental entry would be punished, and that
such wrongful entry should be a misdemeanor. Otherwise, EFTA feared that the "severe
level of penalties in the bill might actually dissuade reporting of wrongdoing. Scaling the
criminal penalty should overcome such resistance." Id. at 139 (recommendations of EFTA).
The EF'A also suggested that "if fines and money damages were made available to the
injured party, reporting would be encouraged." Id.
The 1981 proposed legislation adopted many of these suggestions, especially those from
the ABA. It included provisions for concurrent federal/state jurisdiction, but imposed
strict guidelines as to when federal jurisdiction could be exercised over a particular case.
H.R. 3970, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1981). The maximum sentence for any of the offenses
encompassed by the 1981 Act was five years. IM See also Hearing on S. 240, supra note 37,
at 59-64, for the text of S. 240, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1979). The revisions also eliminated
the possibility that allegedly innocent computer enthusiasts who accidently entered the
system could be held criminally liable. H.R. 3970, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1981).
The exact language of the 1981 Act was adopted by the 1983 Act. H.R. 1092, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1983). Parts of this 1983 Act, along with several other bills introduced during the
98th Congress, became part of the 1984 Act, which was passed on October 11, 1984. H.R.
1092, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 3181, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 3570, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 5112, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1983); H.R. 5616, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1983). See also H.R. 4954, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 4954, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1983)
(dealing with computerized medical records). See also H.R. REP. No. 894, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 12-13 (1984); 130 CONG. REc. S14248 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984).
90. Unauthorized access is "analogous to that of 'breaking and entering' rather than
using a computer (similar to the use of a gun) in committing the offense." H.R. REP. No.
894, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1984). Unauthorized access also prohibits employees who have
authorized access from entering a computer "for purposes to which their authorization does
not extend." Act of Oct. 12, 1984, upra note 75, at 2190-91.
91. Act of Oct. 12, 1984, supra note 75, at 2190-91.
JUVENILE COMPUTER CRIME
Congress tailored the statute precisely. It protects the financial,
personal, medical, and employment information contained in the
computerized files of U.S. government agencies, financial institu-
tions regulated by federal law, and consumer reporting agencies
that furnish consumer information to third parties by "means or
facility of interstate commerce."' 2
While Congress meticulously described what was to be pro-
tected under the new law, it left the issue of federal preemption
ambiguous. Originally, the 1984 Act contained a provision ad-
dressing the concerns of state and local authorities over the ex-
panding powers of the federal government,9 3 but at the last
moment, this clause was deleted from the final version of the new
statute.94 However, legislative history seems to indicate a willing-
ness to defer to local authorities, and to "use the [flederal investi-
gative and prosecutive arms ... to [deal] with interstate
operations that cannot be handled effectively because of the limi-
tations of process in local jurisdictions." 91
The activities engaged in by juvenile hackers clearly fall within
the new federal computer crime statute." For example, the seven
Milwaukee teenagers who knowingly accessed the Memorial
Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center's data base containing credit infor-
mation about its patients would have been in violation of the new
law. If prosecuted and found guilty under this statute, they could
92. The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 covers financial records of such finan-
cial institutions as banks, savings banks, trust companies, savings and loans, credit unions,
and consumer financial institutions located in the U.S. and Its territories. 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 3401 (West 1980).
The Fair Credit Reporting Act covers consumer reporting agencies who furnish their
information to third parties by means or facility of interstate commerce. Consumer records
contain not only credit information, but also personal, employment, and medical data as it
relates to a consumer's credit. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681a (West 1982).
93. The provision stated that "[the statute did] not prohibit any lawful authorized in-
vestigative, protective or intelligence activity of a law enforcement agency of the United
States, a state, or a political subdivision thereof, or an intelligence agency of the United
States." 130 CONG. REc. S14445-46 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984). Even this provision was not as
definitive as the clauses in the 1981 Act and the 1983 Act, because it failed to spell out
precisely when federal jurisdiction could have been exercised, or whether such jurisdiction
was to be held concurrently. Compare the language in H.R. 3970, 97th Cong., 1st Seas.
(1981) and H.R. 1092, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) with the terms proposed for the 1984 Act.
94. Compare the language of 1984 Act in 130 CONG. REC. S14445-46 (daily ed. Oct. 11,
1984) with the final version in Act of Oct. 12, 1984, supra note 75.
95. Hearing on Computer Crime, supra note 23, at 29-30 (Statement of John Keeney,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice). Floyd 1.
Clarke, Deputy Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, FBI, agreed with Kee-
ney's statements. I& at 30.
96. H.R. REP. No. 894, 98th Cong., 2d Seas. 21(984).
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have faced "a fine of not more than the greater of $5,000 or twice
the value obtained or loss created by the offense or imprisonment
for not more than one year, or both."'
Given the severity of the penalties provided in the 1984 Act,
there has been some hesitation in prosecuting juveniles.98 Fur-
thermore, because of the confidentiality requirements of juvenile
criminal proceedings, the successful prosecution of a teenage
hacker may go unnoticed by other potential violators.9 There-
fore, criminal sanctions may be of minimal value in deterring ju-
venile hacking.
The solution to the problem of curbing hacking may lie in im-
posing civil liability. Because federal authorities may hesitate to
criminally prosecute, federal legislation providing for civil causes
of action may be more effective. Moreover, the possibility of mon-
etary compensation may provide motivation for computer victims
to file suit.1' °
IV
Possible Civil Liabilities
Civil liability serves a dual purpose: deterrence and compensa-
tion. If teenagers know that they will be personally liable to com-
pensate victims for the damage they cause, they may be dissuaded
from invading the computer systems of others. A victim, unwill-
ing to criminally prosecute a juvenile, may be willing to seek civil
redress and restitution.10 1
Currently, only three states, Virginia, California, and Connecti-
cut, grant statutory civil relief for injury caused by unauthorized
computer access. 2 The Virginia law provides that "[a]ny person
whose property or person shall be injured by reason of a violation
of any provision [of this statute] may sue therefor and recover for
any damages sustained, and the costs of suit. Without limiting the
generality of the term, 'damages' shall include loss of profits."' '
The California statute states: "[T]he owner or lessee of the com-
97. Act of Oct. 12, 1984, supra note 75, at 2191.
98. See supra text accompanying note 86.
99. R. BELAIR, CRIbINAL JUSnCE INFORMATION POLICY: PRIVACY AND JUVENILE JUS-
TICE REcORDs 81-83, 137 n.153 (1982).
100. See EFTA's suggestions supra note 89.
101. Id.. See also Note, Misappropriation of Computer Services: The Need to Enforce
Civil Liability, 4 COMPUTER/L. J. 401 (1983).
102. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(h) (Deering Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 18.2-152.12 (Supp
1984); Act of May 31, 1984, Pub. Act No. 84-206, 1984 Conn. Pub. Acts.
103. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.12 (Supp. 1984).
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puter system... may bring a civil action against any person...
for compensatory damages, including any expenditure reasonably
and necessarily incurred" to make sure that the computer system
and the information contained within has not been "altered, dam-
aged, or deleted by the access."'' 4 The California law also holds
the parents of an unemancipated minor responsible for their
child's conduct, but only if there has been a conviction.10 It also
permits the court to award attorney's fees to a successful plain-
tiff.I°6 The recently enacted Connecticut law allows a victim to
file a suit in equity if the aggrieved party reasonably believes "that
any other person has been engaged in an alleged violation of any
provision of [the statute]."' 0 7 Equitable remedies available under
this law are: (1) injunctive relief, (2) restitution, and (3) receiver-
ship."' ' The victim may also bring an independent action for
damages, or such a damage claim may be brought in conjunction
with a suit in equity.'"
Although most states do not have such similar statutes, civil
remedies may nonetheless exist. Generally, a child can be held
liable for his or her own negligent or intentional act."'0 Since few
teenagers are independently wealthy or financially solvent, how-
ever, filing a private cause of action against a minor tortfeasor may
prove fruitless."' If the juvenile's parents are joined in the action,
the theory of vicarious parental liability, statutorily codified in all
fifty states,1 2 imputes the juvenile's conduct to his or her
104. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(h) (Deering Supp. 1985).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Act of May 31, 1984, Pub. Act No. 84-206, 1984 Conn. Pub. Acts.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 1071 (5th ed. 1984).
111. General Ins. Co. v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 320, 130 S.E.2d 645, 648 (1963).
112. ALA. CODE § 6-5-380 (1977); ALASKA STAT. § 34.50.020 (1983); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-661 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-109 (Supp. 1983); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714.1 (Deer.
ing Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-107 (Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572
(1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3922 (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.24 (West Supp.
1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-113 (1982); HAwAII REV. STAT. § 577-3 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 6-
210 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, § 53-55 (Smaith-Hurd Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-
31-1 (Burns Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 613.16 (West Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-120 (1981); Ky. REv. STAT. § 405.025 (Supp. 1982); LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 237, 2317
(West 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 217 (1981); MD. CTS. & JuD. PRoc. CODE ANN.
§ 3-829 (Supp. 1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85G (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2913 (Callaghan Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 540.18 (West
Supp. 1983); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-13-2 (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.045 (Vernon
Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-237 to -238 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-801 (1978);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.470 (1980); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:45 (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT.
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parents."n
Some of the state statutes not only make parents liable for the
damage to person and property, but also hold them responsible for
the thefts committed by their children.114 The statutes are all sim-
ilar in scope. They will not impose vicarious liability for negligent
acts, instead requiring either "willful" or "malicious" behavior by
the juveniles."5 In addition, most of the statutes require that the
ANN. § 2A:53A-15 (West Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-46 (1981); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.
LAw § 3-112 (McKinney Supp. 1983); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw § 78-a (McKinney Supp. 1983);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-538.1 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-39, -09.2 (1976 & Supp. 1983);
OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.09 (Page 1980); OKiA. STAT. ANN tit. 23, § 10 (West Supp.
1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.765 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2001-2005 (Purdon Supp.
1984); RI. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-3 (Supp. 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-340 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 25-5-15 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-10-101 to -103
(Supp. 1983); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.01-.02 (Vernon 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-20
(1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 901 (1974); VA. CODE §§ 8.01-43 to -44 (1977 & Supp. 1983);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.190 (Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 55-7A-1 to -2 (1981 & Supp.
1983); WLs. STAT. ANN. § 895.035 (West Supp. 1983); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-203 (1977).
113. At common law, vicarious parental liability did not exist. General Ins. Co., 259 N.C.
at 320, 130 S.E.2d at 648. '"he mere relationship of parent and child" did not make parents
liable for the torts of their offspring. Id., 130 S.E.2d at 648.
All 50 states, however, have statutorily changed this common law principle to permit
parents to be held vicariously liable for the willful, intentional, or malicious conduct of
their children that resulted in personal injury or property damage. See supra note 112.
The states enacted the vicarious parental liability statutes "to curb the rising rate of juve-
nile delinquency and the resulting increase in property damage." Note, Torts: The Consti-
tutional Validity of Parental Liability Statutes, 55 MARQ. L. REV. 584, 586 (1972). Since
parents cared for and controlled their offspring, they were given the responsibility to pro-
tect the public from the delinquent acts committed by their children and to compensate the
victim. Id. at 586-87. One court stated
that parental indifference and failure to supervise the activities of children [was]
one of the major causes [of the growth in] juvenile delinquency; that parental lia-
bility for harm done by children [would] stimulate attention and supervision; and
that the total effect [would] be a reduction in the anti-social behavior of children.
General Ins. Co., 259 N.C. at 323, 130 S.E.2d at 650. Additionally, it was considered "more
equitable to have the parents of a delinquent child bear at least some of the resulting loss,
rather than innocent third parties." Note, supra, at 587.
Although the parental liability statutes have met with due process challenges, they have
withstood constitutional challenge by courts in several states. See General Ins. Co. v.
Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645 (1963); Vanthournout v. Burge, 69 Ill. App. 3d 193,
387 N.E.2d 341 (1979); In re John H., 293 Md. 295, 443 A.2d 594 (1982); Stang v. Waller, 415
So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
One court has held that a state has a legitimate interest in deterring juvenile delinquency
and in compensating the victims, and that a statute that imposes vicarious liability on the
parents of children who committed willful tortious acts is not violative of due process.
Vanthournout, 69 Ill. App. 3d at 195, 387 N.E.2d at 343. All 50 states have set reasonable
limits of liability. See generally aupra note 112. The ceiling amounts range from $500 to
$5000. Id.
114. See, e.g., FA. STAT. ANN. § 741.24 (West Supp. 1983); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 3-829 (Supp. 1983); OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.09 (Page 1980); S.C. CODE ANN;
§ 20-7-340 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983).
115. See supra note 112.
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minors must have been under the control and custody of the par-
ents or guardians at the time of the misconduct.11 6
The victim of juvenile hacking may prevail in a suit brought
under the parental liability laws, if he or she can prove: (1) the
juvenile's "willful" or "malicious" intent to do the delinquent
act," 7 or in California, "willful misconduct,""' 8 and (2) actual
damage to property or theft as a result of the intent."9
To prove "willful" intent the plaintiff must show both the in-
tent to do the wrongful act that caused the damage, and the intent
to damage. 2 ° A juvenile who intentionally and without authoriza-
tion accesses a system to alter or to purposefully destroy the com-
puterized records has the requisite "willful" intent. To prove
"malicious" intent or "willful misconduct," however, one must
demonstrate the following: "(1) the intentional doing of something
with knowledge (expressed or implied) that serious [damage] is
the probable (as distinguished from the possible) result, or (2) the
intentional doing of an act with a wanton and reckless disregard of
its consequences. '"12' Therefore, if a hacker knows that his or her
conduct will probably result in the destruction of valuable infor-
mation stored in a data base, but continues to trespass into the
system in total disregard of this danger, and the system is dam-
aged as a result, this activity can be characterized as "willful mis-
conduct," and thus, he may be found to have harbored "malicious"
intent.2 2
Finally, since computer information, storage, and time have
been held to be property, 12 3 if the juvenile hacker can be shown to
116. Id.; see also Note, Constitutional Law--Constitutionality of Legislative Imposition
of Vicarious Parental Liability for Delinquent Acts of Juveniles, 12 BALTIMORE L. REV.
171, 172-73 (1982). Generally, a parent has control and custody of the child if the minor is
under 18 years old, is unemancipated, and resides with the mother or father. See vicarious
parental liability statutes of Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky,
Mississippi, and South Dakota supra note 112.
117. See supra note 112.
118. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1714.1 (Deering Supp. 1985).
119. See supra note 112.
120. Case Note, Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bill A Narrower Scope of Liability
for Parents of Children Tor(feasors and the Applicability of Subrogation to § 3109.09 of the
Ohio Revised Code, 6 OHIO N.U.L. REv. 636, 642 (1979); see also Note, Motorist Mutual In-
surance Company v. Bilk A Limitation on Parental Liability and Wilful Acts, 9 CAP. U.L
REv. 749 (1980).
121. 4 B. WrrKm, SuMMARY OF CALiFORNiA LAW § 850A (8th ed. Supp. 1982); E. WAL.
LACH & W. BOONE, CALIFORNIA TORT GUIDE § 1.14 (2d ed. 1979); see also Morgan v. South-
ern Pac. Trans. Co., 37 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1012, 112 Cal. Rptr. 695, 698 (1974).
122. Note, supra note 120, at 750.
123. See supra text accompanying note 81.
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have damaged or stolen any of these items with the requisite in-
tent, a hacker's parents may be held liable under the vicarious lia-
bility statute. They would be held responsible for compensating
the victim up to the amount of the damage or the liability limit of
the state statute, whichever figure is less.i
24
If intent cannot be proven, however, because the hacker be-
haved negligently, the victim may pursue claims against the par-
ents under other tort theories. For example, the injured party
may assert that the parents acted negligently in their control and
supervision of the misbehaving adolescent. Parental negligence
may be difficult to prove; ordinary prudence" would not likely
prevent a parent from giving his or her child a computer or al-
lowing the child to use a terminal without supervision. Moreover,
liability cannot be established by proving that the parents en-
trusted their child with a dangerous weapon, 26 except in the un-
likely event that a computer is found to be a dangerous
instrument.1l 7 Therefore, in the absence of proof of parental neg-
ligence, or agency, or public acceptance that a computer is a dan-
gerous instrument, a victim of hacking cannot obtain
compensation from the parents if the child has acted only
negligently.
In sum, the application of vicarious parental liability to hacking
is limited.128 It is only viable where the child acts intentionally or
maliciously. States appear disinclined to impose vicarious liability
for negligent acts.
What is needed to effectively deter teenage hackers is a specific
statute that would hold juveniles civilly liable or, in the case of an
unemancipated minor, that would hold the parents vicariously lia-
ble for any injury, including personal harm and property damage,
124. See supra text accompanying notes 112-13.
125. A person acts with ordinary prudence when his behavior conforms with the "com-
munity ideal of reasonable behavior, determined by the jury's social judgment." W. KEE-
TON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 175 (5th ed. 1984).
126. See Note, supra note 120, at 750-51, for an explanation of what is meant by "en-
trusting a child with a dangerous instrumentality," an act for which a parent can be held
liable in limited situations. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.3 (Deering Supp. 1985).
127. However, consider the following- Floyd I. Clarke analogized that a computer was
"much like a gun, a knife." Ferraro, supra note 9, at 1, col. 3. When teenage hacking re-
sults in personal injuries or death, the public may reconsider its thinking.
128. A problem also arises when one tries to execute a judgment obtained under one
state's vicarious liability statute in another state, because of limitations in the long-arm
statute of the state where judgment was issued. See Memorial Lawn Cemeteries Ass'n v
Carr, 540 P.2d 1156 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1975). (. Indiana Ins. Co. v. Pettigrew, 115 Cal. App. 3d
862, 171 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1981).
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caused by a juvenile's knowing unauthorized access into another's
computer system. Under such a law, a victim could sue for com-
pensatory damages, including losses in computer time and serv-
ices, and costs of employing personnel to verify that the records in
the data base have not been modified, damaged, or deleted.
Although the California statute' 9 is similar to this recommenda-
tion, it focuses on property damage, 130 and restitution is available
only when there is a criminal conviction.1 3 1 The California law is
also ambiguous as to what intent is needed to sustain a civil action.
While the criminal section of this statute requires that the crimi-
nal activity be conducted "maliciously" when it involves credit in-
formation and "intentionally ... with knowledge" for any other
unauthorized access,132 civil actions are conditioned on successful
criminal prosecution and are linked to the vicarious parental lia-
bility statute which mandates "willful misconduct" on the part of
the minor.133 Although the civil relief encompassed in the Vir-
ginia law is also similar to the statute suggested by this note, it
does not impose vicarious liability on the parents of juvenile hack-





As American society has become more computer literate and
more dependent on electronic data processing systems, juveniles
have become involved in computer crime, especially in the form of
hacking. In the absence of ethical instruction to accompany basic
computer education, and in light of the reluctance of the public to
call for the criminal prosecution of juveniles, hacking will likely
continue. Where the criminal law falters, victims of juvenile com-
puter crime should look to civil remedies to discourage miscon-
duct and to recover their losses. State lawmakers should assist
their endeavors by passing such appropriate legislation as vicari-
ous parental liability statutes allowing victims of juvenile hackers
129. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (Deering Supp. 1985).
130. Id.
131. Id. See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.35.5 (Page Supp. 1984). The Ohio statute
provides tnat a delinquent convicted of computer fraud or theft may be required to make
restitution for property damage as a condition of probation.
132. CAL PENAL CODE § 502 (Deering Supp. 1985).
133. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.1 (Deering Supp. 1984).
134. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.12 (Supp. 1984).
135. Act of May 31, 1984, Pub. Act No. 84-206, 1984 Conn. Pub. Acts.
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to recover in civil suits independent of criminal prosecution. The
vacuum in the existing computer crime laws should not remain.
